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ABSTRACT 
The paper provides for the first time a comprehensive introduction into the mechanisms 
through which the method of separation achieves risk reduction and into the ways it can be 
implemented in engineering designs.  
The concept stochastic separation of critical random events on a time interval based on 
guaranteeing with a specified probability a degree of distancing between them is introduced.  
Efficient methods for providing stochastic separation by reducing the duration times of 
overlapping critical random events on a time interval are presented. 
The paper also shows that the probability of overlapping of critical events, randomly 
appearing on a time interval, is practically insensitive to the distribution of their duration 
times and to the variance of the duration times as long as the mean remains the same. A 
rigorous proof has been presented that this statement is valid even for two random events on a 
time interval. 
The paper also provides insight into various mechanisms through which deterministic 
separation improves reliability and reduces risk. It is demonstrated that the separation on 
properties is an efficient technique for compensating the drawbacks associated with 
homogeneous properties. It is demonstrated improving reliability by including redundancy, 
improving reliability by a segmentation and some of the deliberate weak link techniques and 
stress limiters techniques for reducing risk are effectively special cases of a deterministic 
separation. 
Finally, the paper demonstrates that in a number of cases, the only way to extract benefit 
from the method of separation is to build and analyse a mathematical model or algorithm 
based on the method of separation. A comprehensive classification of the discussed methods 
of stochastic and deterministic separation is also presented. 
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1. Introduction 
A systematic classification of generic methods for reducing technical risk is crucial to safe 
operation, engineering designs and software, yet this very important topic has not been 
covered with sufficient depth in the reliability and risk literature. For many decades, the focus 
of reliability research has been primarily on reliability prediction rather than reliability 
improvement and risk reduction. A common tendency in reliability prediction is to select a 
statistical‐based, data-driven approach. Calculating the absolute reliability built in a product 
is a difficult task because often, reliability‐critical data (failure frequencies, strength 
distribution of the flaws, failure mechanisms and repair times) are unavailable, particularly 
for new designs, with no failure history. In addition, for highly reliable components and 
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systems, the amount of existing past failures is insufficient to fit a reliable and robust 
statistical model. The sparse available data leads to increased levels of uncertainty in the 
model parameters and poor predictive power of the model. In addition, past reliability data 
collected for a particular type of environment/duty cycle, often yield poor predictions if 
applied to another environment/duty cycle.  
Some of these difficulties led some authors (Knowles, 1993) to question the 
appropriateness of a reliability prediction based on past failure rates.  
The deficiencies of the data driven approach can be clearly seen on studying of the 
reliability of a simple system built on n identical components each characterised by reliability 
R , the reliability of the system becomes nsys RR  . Increasing the number of tests n will 
reduce the uncertainty associated with the unknown reliability R but will never eliminate it. 
An error R in the reliability of a single component will then lead to a large error 
)/(/ RRnRR syssys   in the predicted reliability for the system. For a system composed of 
50 capacitors, from the same production batch, logically arranged in series, a mere 1% 
relative error in the estimated reliability of a single capacitor will result in 
5.001.050/  syssys RR  (50%) error in the estimated system reliability, which makes the 
reliability prediction meaningless.  
The deficiencies of the data-driven approach prompted the development of the physics-of-
failure-based approach to reliability improvement (Pecht et al, 1990; Pecht, 1990) which is 
relatively independent of historical failure data.  
According to this approach, failures and decline in performance of components and 
systems occur due to known underlying failure mechanisms. As a result, unlike the data-
driven approach, the physics-of-failure approach addresses the underlying causes of failure. 
Many failure mechanisms lead to accumulation of damage. Failure is initiated when the 
amount of accumulated damage exceeds the endurance limit. As a result, the time to failure 
of components can be physically modelled.  
However, the physics-of-failure approach is also associated with big difficulties which 
were discussed in detail in (Todinov, 2017). Acquiring the relevant knowledge and data 
related to failure mechanisms and quantifying all types of uncertainty, necessary for a correct 
physics-of-failure model of the time to failure is not always possible because of the 
complexity of the physical mechanisms underlying the failure modes, the complex nature of 
the environment and the operational stresses. 
Building a physics-of-failure is a formidable task which does not need to be addressed if a 
third approach is adopted to reliability improvement and risk reduction where the focus is on 
general methods and principles for reliability improvement and risk reduction. As a rule, the 
general reliability risk reduction methods and principles do not rely on reliability data or on a 
detailed knowledge of physical mechanisms underlying possible failure modes. These 
methods derive their strength from general laws, invariants and patterns associated with 
increased reliability and reduced risk. As a result, these methods are particularly useful in 
developing new designs, with no failure history and with insufficiently researched failure 
mechanisms. Work on formulating general principles and methods for improving the 
reliability and reducing technical risk has already been done (Todinov 2007, 2015, 2016). 
The present paper contributes to the exiting work an important generic reliability 
improvement and risk reduction method referred to as ‘the method of separation’.  
Harmful interaction of factors critical to reliability and risk is a major source of failures. 
Separating risk-critical factors to reduce this harmful interaction is therefore a major avenue 
for improving reliability and reducing risk. Surprisingly, the method of separation has not yet 
been discussed as a risk-reduction tool. Despite that a number of techniques used in 
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engineering are clearly instances of the method of separation, they have never been 
recognised as such and have never been linked with this method. 
The method of division of tasks featured in (Pahl et al, 2007) is effectively an application 
of the method of separation despite that it has not been linked with this method.  
Next, deliberate weak links and stress limiters have already been used for preventing the 
stresses from reaching dangerous levels. The deliberate weak links are consciously designed 
weak points that are easily replaced (Eder, 2008) and usually protect expensive devices and 
reduce risk by reducing the consequences from failure. Despite that this technique is 
effectively an instance of a separation on a parameter, it has never been recognised as such 
and has never been linked with the method of separation.  
Another example can be given with the concept ‘barrier’ (Svenson, 1991; Leveson, 2011; 
Hollangel, 2016). Barriers have also been used as accident prevention tools and protection 
measure mitigating the consequences from an accident. A classification of barriers has been 
proposed in (Eder, 2008). Despite that barriers are also instances of separation, no link has 
ever been made with the method of separation. Barriers distancing triggers from hazards 
reduce the likelihood of an accident while barriers distancing hazards from targets reduce the 
consequences given that accident has occurred. 
Separation has been applied in the TRIZ methodology for inventive problem solving 
(Altshuller 1984,1996,2007) for resolving physical contradictions in engineering of the type: 
‘the object must have attribute A during one mode of use or during one stage of a particular 
process and the opposite attribute (not A) during an alternative mode of use or an alternative 
process stage’. However, the separation principle in TRIZ is not oriented towards reliability 
improvement and risk reduction and no specific treatment has been provided in the TRIZ 
methodology related to the mechanisms through which the separation works in increasing 
reliability and reducing risk which is central to the understanding and systematic application 
of this method for improving the reliability of engineering designs. No specific discussion 
regarding the mechanisms through which the method of separation increases reliability has 
been presented in more recent literature related to TRIZ (Terninko et al. 1998; Savransky 
2000; Orloff 2006,2012; Rantanen and Domb, 2008; Gadd 2011).  
TRIZ and other frameworks where the method of separation has been used never 
considered stochastic separation for which the separation is guaranteed only with a certain 
probability. TRIZ also never considered logical separation, where no time, space, or 
separation on a condition is present yet the dangerous proximity of hazards and targets is 
prevented. 
The research conducted on the method of separation revealed that despite some isolated 
applications of the method of separation for risk reduction, such as separating hazards and 
targets by barriers’, designing ‘deliberate weak links’ and ‘stress limiters’, these techniques 
are not understood as manifestations of the universal method of separation.  
Here, it needs to be pointed out that ‘the method of separation’ is not equivalent to ‘the 
traditional method of barriers separating hazards from targets’. While the method of barriers 
between hazards and targets is a special case of the method of separation and has been widely 
used before, a number of mechanisms and techniques of the method of separation are 
fundamentally different and virtually unknown to engineers-designers and reliability 
practitioners. Here are some examples: 
 - The method of ‘stochastic separation’ which is also a special case of the method of 
separation does need theoretical models to be implemented correctly and derive any benefits 
from it; 
 - Separation based on the cost of failure and its application aspects is still not well 
understood considering the large number of high-consequence failures, in different industries, 
where the reliability of the component was not commensurate with the cost of its failure.  
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 - Separation to counter poor performance caused by homogeneity is not understood 
and rarely used in design. The list can be continued. 
The existing research on the method of separation as a risk reduction tool (Todinov, 2015) 
is rather limited and focuses only on the application of the separation method for blocking 
common cause.  
A central weakness in applying the method of separation identified in the published 
literature is that no coverage of the mechanisms through which the method achieves 
reliability improvement and risk reduction has been presented. The lack of knowledge of the 
mechanisms through which the method of separation works does not permit its systematic 
implementation for improve reliability of engineering designs. 
Another weakness in applying the method of separation is that this method has never been 
linked with mathematical models or algorithms which in a number of cases are absolutely 
necessary to release its potential. 
By providing a succinct description of the system, a mathematical model or algorithm based 
on the method of separation would deliver significant benefits: 
- The system can be described by taking into consideration the complex interaction of risk-
critical factors which could not be contemplated by an engineer-designer. 
- A mathematical model or an algorithm based on the method of separation provides a way 
of tracking the impact of the risk-factors on the reliability and risk level. In this respect, the 
mathematical model/algorithm provides an insight into which control variables are essential 
and which seemingly important control variables have actually no practical impact on the 
reliability and risk level. 
- A mathematical model or algorithm based on the method of separation provides insight 
into which factor need to be altered and by how much to ensure an optimal effect (for 
example, balance between risk and cost of investment).  
The identified gaps in the existing research on the method of separation define the primary 
objective of this paper: a comprehensive introduction into the mechanisms through which the 
method of separation achieves risk reduction and into the ways this method can be 
implemented in engineering designs. 
Another objective of the paper to demonstrate that in a number of cases, the only way to 
extract benefit from the method of separation is to build and analyse a mathematical model or 
algorithm based on the method of separation.  
 
 
2. Stochastic separation of risk-critical factors/events 
 
2.1 Real-life applications which require stochastic separation  
 
Risk is often the result of the simultaneous presence of risk-critical factors. Reducing risk 
then depends on the existence of a separation between the risk-critical factors. Here are a 
number of real-world examples illustrating this point. 
 
5 
 
 
Figure 1 Common examples where risk depends on the existence of separation between risk-critical 
factors/events. 
 
 A source servicing a number of randomly arriving requests (demands), where the source 
can only serve a single request at a time. Unsatisfied demand occurs if two or more demands 
cluster within a critical distance s (Figure 1a). 
The competition of random demands for a particular resource/service on a finite time 
interval is a common example of risk and reliability controlled by the simultaneous presence 
of critical events. The appearance of a critical event engages the servicing resources and if a 
new critical event occurs during the service time of the first critical event, no servicing 
resources will be available for the second event.  
Suppose that only a single repair unit is available for servicing failures on a power line. In 
the case of a power line failure, the repair resource will be engaged and if another failure 
occurs during the repair time s associated with the first failure (Fig.1c), no free repair 
resource will be available for recovering the power distribution system from the last failure. 
The delay in the second repair could lead to overloading of the power distribution system 
thereby inducing further failures. 
There are cases where a very low probability of simultaneous presence (overlapping) of 
risk-critical critical events can be tolerated. A very low probability of a simultaneous 
presence of random demands can, for example, be tolerated in a situation where critically 
injured people demand a particular piece of life-saving equipment for a time s t (Fig.1b). If 
only a single piece of life-saving equipment is available, simultaneous demands within a time 
interval with length s cannot be satisfied and the consequences could be fatal.  
 Stored spare equipment servicing the needs of customers arriving randomly during a 
specified time interval. After a demand from a customer, the warehouse needs a minimum 
time s to restore/return the dispatched equipment before the next demand can be serviced. In 
this case, the probability of unsatisfied demand equals the probability of clustering of two or 
more customer arrivals within the critical period needed for making the equipment available 
for the next customer (Figure 1a). 
 Supply systems which accumulate the supplied resource before it is dispatched for 
consumption (compressed gaseous substances for example). Suppose that after a demand for 
the resource, the system needs a minimum period of specified length s to restore the amount 
of supplied resource to the level existing before the demand. In this case, the probability of 
unsatisfied demand equals the probability of clustering two or more demands within the 
critical recovery period s (Figure 1a). 
 A related category of risk controlled by the overlapping (simultaneous presence) of 
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critical events is present when the appearance of one critical event (e.g. a shock) requires a 
particular time during which the system needs to recover. If another event appears before the 
system has recovered, the system’s strength/capacity is exceeded by the load which results in 
system failure.  
Such are, for example, shocks caused by failures associated with pollution to the 
environment (e.g. a leakage of chemicals) (Fig.1c). If such a failure is followed by another 
failure associated with leakage of chemicals, before a critical time interval has elapsed 
needed for recovery from pollution, irreparable damage to the environment could be done . 
For example, clustering of failures associated with a release of chemicals in the sea water 
could result in a dangerously high acidity which will destroy marine life. 
 Forces acting on a loaded component which fails if two or more forces cluster within a 
critical time interval s. 
 Clustering of two or more random flaws over a small critical distance s (Fig.1.d) 
dangerously decreases the load-carrying capacity of thin fibres and wires. As a result, a 
configuration where two or more flaws are closer than a critical distance cannot be tolerated 
during loading. Reliability in this case is governed by the probability of clustering of the 
random flaws. 
In all of the suggested real-world examples, the overlapping of the risk-critical random 
events cannot be avoided therefore, risk is directly related to the probability of overlapping of 
risk-critical events. Reducing risk is achieved by reducing the probability of overlapping of 
the risk-critical events. In all these cases, it is important to guarantee with a specified 
probability a separation of minimum length between risk-critical events.  
The probability with which the risk-critical random events should be separated varies 
significantly. It is directly related to the magnitude of the consequences resulting from the 
overlapping of two or more risk-critical events. The level of the probability of separation 
must be set individually by the risk experts in the respective application area. 
Guaranteeing with a specified probability the existence of separation between risk-critical 
factors/events will be referred to as ‘stochastic separation’. 
 
 
2.2 Stochastic separation of a fixed number of random events with different duration 
times 
 
Consider a common case where demands for a single resource occur from a numbre of 
consumers, at random times during a time period, with different duration of the demand 
specific for the consumer. Because of the single piece of resource, a simultaneous demand 
from more than a single consumer cannot be satisfied.  
This statement of the problem is formally presented as n random events, each with 
durations 1d ,..., nd , appearing randomly during a time interval 0,L ( Lddd n  ...21 ). The 
objective is evaluating the probability that no overlapping of random events will be present 
(Fig.2a). The events start times nsss ,...,, 21  are uniformly distributed along the interval (0,L). 
The configuration in Fig.2a will be referred to as X-configuration. Note that the duration of 
the last event cannot possibly contribute to overlapping on the time interval (0,L) and 
therefore can be ignored. The first 1n  duration intervals 1d ,..., 1nd  can then be ‘cut out’ of 
the time interval (0,L) and the remaining parts of the time interval can be ‘brought together’ 
to form a shorter length )...( 121  ndddL  (Fig.2b). As a result of this operation, the 
points nsss ,...,, 21  marking the start of the random events for the X-configuration transform 
into a unique Y-configuration where the points nsss ',...,',' 21  are randomly distributed along 
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the length )...( 121  ndddL . As a result, for each X-configuration, corresponds exactly 
a single Y-configuration. Thus, for the set of all possible X-configurations and the set of all 
possible Y-configurations, the relationship YX   holds.  
 
 
Figure 2. a) X-configuration: fully separated random events in a finite time interval (0,L); b) Y-
configuration: random points generated along the interval (0,L) all falling in the interval 0, 
)...( 121  ndddL . 
 
Now suppose that a set of n random points nsss ',...,',' 21  are randomly generated along the 
length L. If all n randomly generated points fall within the length )...( 121  ndddL , a 
Y-configuration is present. By inserting the corresponding demand intervals id  ( 1,...,1  ni
) after each start time is , an X-configuration will be obtained with random non-overlapping 
demands along the interval 0,L.  
Thus, from each Y-configuration, a unique X-configuration can be obtained by placing 
after the randomly generated points is '  a duration intervals with lengths 1d ,..., 1nd  The start 
times in the X-configuration (Fig.2a) are therefore: 11 'ss  , 122 ' dss  , 2133 ' ddss  ,...,
121 ...'  nnn dddss . In the obtained X-configuration, all random events are fully 
separated. As a result, to each Y-configuration corresponds exactly a single X-configuration. 
Thus, for the set of all possible Y-configurations and the set of all possible X-configurations, 
the relationship XY   holds. 
Since for the sets of the X-configurations and Y-configurations XY   and YX   
simultaneously hold, there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the X-configurations, 
characterised by randomly located non-overlapping random events and the Y-configurations, 
characterised by randomly located random points on the smaller time interval
)...( 121  ndddL . Because of the one-to-one correspondence between X-configurations 
and Y-configurations, the probability of an X-configuration can be estimated by the 
probability of a Y-configuration. 
Suppose that the start times of the events are uniformly distributed along the length of the 
time interval (0,L). Let 1A , 2A ,..., nA  denote the events ‘the last event has a duration 1d , 2d ,...,
nd , correspondingly. The probability of the event B that there will be no overlapping of 
random events can be determined by the following probabilistic argument. 
Initially, the conditional probability )|( nABP  is determined - the probability that there 
will be no overlapping of random events, given that the last event has a duration nd .  Because 
each random event has an equal chance to be the last event, the probabilities )( iAp  of the 
events iA  are all equal to n/1  ( nAp i /1)(  , ni ,...,1 ). 
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The probability of an Y-configuration that n uniformly distributed random points 
nsss ',...,',' 21  along the interval (0,L) will fall in the interval )...( 121  ndddL  is given 
by 
n
n
L
ddL





   )...( 11 . This is also the probability of an X-configuration (no overlapping 
events) given that the last event has a duration nd . 
n
n
n L
dd
ABP 




 
 
)...(
1)|( 11                                               (1) 
The absence of overlapping (event B) however, can occur in n different ways. The absence of 
overlapping can occur given that the last event has a duration , given that the last event has 
a duration ,..., and so on. The probabilities )|( iABP , 1,...,1  ni , are determined in a 
similar fashion. According to the total probability theorem, 
                                     (2) 
As a result, the expression 
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 
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ddd
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ddd
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ddd
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BP 1213132
...
1...
...
1
...
1
1
)(    
(3) 
is obtained for the probability of a full separation (no overlapping) of random events  with 
durations 1d ,..., nd . Equation (3) can also be presented as 













 





 





 

n
n
nn
L
dD
L
dD
L
dD
n
BP 1...11
1
)( 21                            (4) 
where ndddD  ...21 . 
Equation (4) has been confirmed by the results from computer simulations. Thus, for four 
consumers demanding a particular resource for , , , and 
 respectively, during a time interval of 10 hours, the probability of no 
overlapping calculated from equation (4) is 0.7. This probability has been confirmed by the 
probability of 0.7 estimated from the simulation. (The details of the simulation algorithm 
have been omitted). For a given set of events with duration times 1d ,..., nd  three principal 
mechanisms of stochastic separation can be implemented: 
- Providing stochastic separation with a specified probability )(BP  by decreasing the 
durations of the events. 
- Providing stochastic separation with a specified probability )(BP  by increasing the 
length L of the time interval. 
- Providing stochastic separation with a specified probability )(BP  by decreasing the 
number of events. 
All of these mechanisms can be implemented by solving the non-linear equation (4) with 
respect to L, or with respect to n or with respect to the durations of the demand times. 
Suppose that three consumers are demanding a particular resource for min351 d , 
min452 d , and min603 d  during an interval of 500L  min. The factor 10  k  by 
which the demand times 21,dd  and 3d  need to be reduced is now sought so that the 
probability of no overlapping is equal to a specified level of 0.7.  
To determine the factor k, the non-linear equation  
nd
1nd
)()|(...)()|()( 11 nn APABPAPABPBP 
min51 d min102 d min203 d
min354 d
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can be solved with respect to k by a repeated bisection in the interval 101.0 maxmin  kkk  
because at the ends of this interval )(kf  has different signs ( 0)( min kf  and 0)( max kf ). 
The solution of equation (5) with respect to the parameter k, obtained by using a standard 
repeated bisection algorithm, is 6.0k . Thus, in order to provide the required separation 
probability of 0.7, the durations of the demand times need to be reduced to 
21356.0' 11  kdd ; 27456.0' 22  kdd  and 36606.0' 33  kdd . Substituting 
these values in equation (4) where n=3 gives:  
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Suppose that durations 1x , 2x ,..., nn xx ,1  of the first, second,...,nth random event are 
realisations of a random variable X following a statistical distribution with mean   and 
standard deviation  . According to equation (5), the probability that the random events will 
be separated (will not overlap) are given by 

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where 


n
i
ixD
1
.  
The mathematical model of stochastic separation of a fixed number of risk-critical events 
provides the opportunity to gain insight into the fact that the increase of the demand times ix  
by a particular factor 1k  and the increase by the same factor 1k  of the length of the 
operational interval L will have no impact on the probability of overlapping. Thus, an 
increase of the demand times by 10% therefore can be compensated by a corresponding 
increase by 10% of the length of the operation interval L. 
Even for a relatively small number of events, the sum of the event durations 1
1
xx
n
i
i 

, 
1
1
xx
n
i
i 

,..., n
n
i
i xx 
1
 in equation (6) can be approximated reasonably well with )1( n , 
where   is the mean of the duration times ix . As a result, the probability )(BP  of a full 
separation (non-overlapping) of random events becomes 
n
L
n
BP 




 

)1(
1)(                                                        (7) 
This probability is practically insensitive to the variance of the random variable X standing 
for the durations ix  of the demand times. The probability )(BP  depends on the expected 
value )(XE  of the demand times. The probability of event separation is practically 
insensitive to the variance (standard deviation  ) of the demand times X.  
This conclusion has been verified by numerous computer simulations where the 
probability of overlapping has been plotted as a function of the variance of the duration times. 
The simulations involved demand times following a log-normal distribution with mean 
140 min, coming from 36 users over a time interval with length 60000 min (1000 hours). 
Each of the 36 users initiates exactly one demand, randomly located on the operational time 
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interval (0,60000 min). A single source for servicing the random demands is available, 
capable of servicing only a single random demand at a time.  
The simulation results shown in Fig.3 have been obtained after incrementing the standard 
deviation of the demand times by a step of 5min. The calculated probabilities of unsatisfied 
demand of 0.95 correspond to a single source servicing the demands. 
If a constant duration of the random demands is used, equal to the mean of 140 min of the 
log-normal distribution, the same value of 0.95 is obtained for the probability of no 
overlapping.  
In the next simulation experiment, the log-normal distribution of the demand times was 
replaced by a normal distribution with the same mean (140 min). The number of users (36) 
and the length of the operation interval (1000 hours) were kept the same as in the previous 
simulation experiment. The standard deviation of the normal distribution was varied with a 
step of 5 min. The results were almost identical to the results in Fig.3. 
The calculated probability of fully separated random demands was again 0.95. 
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Figure 3. Probability of full separation of random events (no overlapping) as a function of the variance of 
the log-normal distribution modelling the duration times. 
 
In the next simulation experiment, a uniform distribution for the duration of demand times 
has been selected, with a probability density function 
a
tf
2
1
)(   if ata  140140  and 
0)( tf  if at 140  or at 140 , where t is the time. The parameter a determines the 
spread of the uniform distribution. The uniform distribution and its parameter have been 
specified in such a way that its mean (140 min) coincides with the mean of the log-normal 
distribution and the normal distribution used in the previous simulations. Again, the random 
demands come from 36 users over a time interval with length 60000 min (1000 hours). Each 
of the 36 users initiates exactly one demand, randomly located along the operational time 
interval of 1000 hours. The results for the probability of unsatisfied demand, for a different 
spread a of the distribution, are almost identical to the ones shown in Fig.3. 
In the next simulation experiment, a triangular distribution, with probability density 
function )420/1(004762.0)( ttf   was used as a model of the demand times. The 
distribution function and the parameters of the triangular distribution have been specified in 
such a way that its mean (140 min) coincides with the means of the log-normal distribution, 
the normal distribution and the uniform distribution used in the previous simulations. 
Random sampling from the triangular distribution has been done by using the Von Neumann’ 
rejection method (Ross, 1997). 
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The result from the simulation using demand times following a triangular distribution, 
were again 95.0  for the probability of a full separation, if a single source is present. 
The final simulation involved a single source and only n=2 random demands during a time 
interval of 17 hours. The random demand times were sampled from a normal distribution 
with mean 140  minutes. The standard deviation was varied within the range (0-25min). 
As can be verified from the results in Fig.4, even for the smallest possible number of 
random events (n=2) which could result in overlapping, the simulated probability of full 
separation (no overlapping) is still practically insensitive to the variance of the durations of 
the random demands. 
Finally, the duration times were sampled from a discrete distribution with mean equal to 
140 min. The discrete distribution was defined as follows: with probability 0.3 the event 
duration was 200.67 min and with probability 0.7, the event duration was 114 min. The mean 
duration time of the simulated events is therefore 1401147.067.2003.0   min. The 
simulated probability of no overlapping (full separation) was 0.745 and was once again, very 
close to the probability of no overlapping simulated with normal distribution of the event 
durations with mean 140min. 
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Figure 4. Probability of full separation of two random events (no overlapping) as a function of the variance 
of the normal distribution modelling the duration times. 
 
The practical insensitivity of the probability of full event separation to the variance of the 
duration times, for a very small number of random events, can be understood from analysing 
the expression for the probability of no overlapping of two random events. From equation (3), 
this probability is: 
    2122 /1/12
1
)( LxLxBP                                                  (8) 
where 1x  is a random variable representing the duration time of the first event and 2x  is a 
random variable representing the duration times of the second random event. 
Expanding expression (8) results in 
 22112222 //21//215.0)( LxLxLxLxBP                             (9) 
Taking expectations from both sides of equation (9) results in 
 )/(/)(21)/(/)(215.0)]([ 2212222 LxELxELxELxEBPE                   (10) 
In equation (10), xxExE  )()( 21 , where x  is the mean of the duration times of the 
random events.  
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It is known that if X is a random variable with finite mean and y is a convex function (
R babaybyay ,;10),)1(()()1()(  ) then the Jensen’s inequality holds 
(Rosenthal, 2006): 
 )())(( xEyxyE                                                    (11) 
The function nLxy )/(  is a convex function for 1n , therefore, according to the Jensen’s 
inequality, nn LxLxE )/(])/[(   holds. However, for small ratios Lxi /  ( 2,1i ), the terms 
nn
i Lx /  are very small, and the error from replacing )/(
nn
i LxE  with 
nnnn
i LxLxE /)/)]([   are 
also very small. Consequently, 
2
22 1)//21)()]([ 






L
x
LxLxBPBPE                                   (12) 
can be used for the probability of no overlapping of the random events. As can be verified 
from equation (12), for small ratios Lx / , the probability of no overlapping of two random 
events is practically insensitive to the variance of their duration times. 
Indeed, consider the function nLxxf )/()(  , 2n , where 1/ Lx . Consider also the 
linear function )(xg  which is a tangent to nLxxf )/()(  , at xx  . Let us restrict the 
average demand time to Lx )20/1(||  . 
Considering that for the derivative of nLxxf )/()(   we have 1)/)(/()('  nLxLnxf , the 
slope of the tangent at xx   is 1)/)(/()('  nLxLnxf . The tangent line therefore has the 
equation 
 xLxLnLxxLxLnxg nnn 11 )/)(/()/()/)(/()(                                    (13) 
The difference )()( xgxf   becomes 
xLxLnLxxLxLnLxxgxf nnnn 11 )/)(/()/()/)(/()/()()(                     (14) 
However, x can be presented as hxx  , where h is a positive or negative increment. Let 
us restrict its absolute value also to Lh )20/1(||  .  
Substituting hxx   in equation (14) gives 
xLxLnLxhxLxLnLhxxgxf nnnnn 11 )/)(/()/()()/)(/(/)()()(      (15) 
Expanding the right hand side of (15) gives 
n
n
n
n
n
n
L
h
L
h
L
xnnn
L
h
L
xnn
hxghxf 








....
!3
)2)(1(
!2
)1(
)()(
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
               (16) 
Without loss of generality we could assume that 0h . For the right hand side of (16) we 
have 
n
n
L
hnnnnn
xgxf 









 1....
!3
)2)(1(
!2
)1(
)()(  
Considering that n
nnnnn
n 21....
!3
)2)(1(
!2
)1(




 ,  
nnn
n
n
n
n
L
h
xgxf
10
1
102
1
22)()( 

                                         (17) 
As a result, the difference )()( xgxf   is very small and its expected value can be 
considered to be negligible 
0)]()([  xgxfE                                                               (18) 
Taking expected values from the left hand side of equation (15) results in 
])/)(/()/()/)(/()/[()]()([ 11 xLxLnLxxLxLnLxExgxfE nnnn    
which is equivalent to 
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nn LxELxExgxfE )/)((])/[()]()([                                           (19) 
Because from equation it follows that 0)]()([  xgxfE , equation (19) now yields 
nnnn LxLxELxE /]/)([])/[(                                                       (20) 
for small ratios Lx / . 
Consequently, equation (12) can indeed be used for the probability of no overlapping of the 
random events. For small ratios Lx / , the probability of no overlapping of the two random 
events is practically insensitive to the variance of their duration times. 
Equation (12) has also been verified by numerous computer simulations. 
The simulation results and the theoretical analysis demonstrate that the probability of non-
overlapping of random events is practically insensitive to the type of the distribution of the 
duration times, provided that the means of the distributions are not altered.  
The simulation results and the theoretical analysis also demonstrate that the probability of 
non-overlapping of random events is practically insensitive to the variance of the duration 
times. 
The mathematical model of stochastic separation of a fixed number of risk-critical events 
provided the insight that the variance of the demand times X practically has no impact on the 
level of risk as long as the mean of the demand times remains the same. 
These results also provide the valuable opportunity to work with random demand times 
characterised by their means only and not requiring information related to the variance of the 
demand times. 
 
2.3 Stochastic separation of random events following a homogeneous Poisson process  
 
Suppose that the times of the risk-critical events follow a homogeneous Poisson process in 
the time interval (0,L) and each event has a duration equal to ‘s’. In other words, the number 
of events in the time interval is a random variable. According to an equation rigorously 
derived in (Todinov, 2004), the probability 0p  that there will be no clustering of two or more 
random events within a critical distance s is 





 



!
])1([
...
!2
)(
1)exp(
22
0 r
srLsL
LLp
rr
 ,                           (21) 
where r denotes the maximum number of time gaps of length s, which can be accommodated 
into the finite time interval with length L ( 1]/[  sLr  ), where  is the greatest integer 
which does not exceed the ratio L/s). 
Consider now the real-life problem of requests for particular unique control equipment 
during a 24 hour period. The requests arrive randomly (follow a homogeneous Poisson 
process) with density 0.2 hour-1 (on average 2 requests per 10 hours) and the control 
equipment can service only a single request at a time. Assume that initially s=1 hour has 
been allocated for servicing each request. Without using a stochastic separation model the 
actual probability of unsatisfied request for the control equipment could not be guessed 
correctly even by experts. The calculation using the model presented by equation (21) yields 
the highly counter-intuitive result that there is approximately 52% probability that within 24 
hours there will be a case for which no control equipment will be available on demand. This 
counter-intuitive result is actually confirmed by the Monte Carlo simulation which also yields 
52% for the probability that the equipment will be unavailable on demand. 
To reduce the probability that the control equipment will be unavailable on demand to 
20%, the equation 
]/[ sL
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                              (22) 
must be solved with respect to s. The solution yields, 25.0s h. In order to provide a 
stochastic separation that satisfies the tolerable probability of unsatisfied demand of 20%, the 
use of the control equipment must be restricted to 0.25hours. 
This real-life example demonstrates that only by creating a mathematical model (or 
algorithm) based on the principle of separation, benefit can be extracted from the method of 
stochastic separation. 
Running the model of the stochastic time separation of demand following a Poisson process 
reveals an interesting behaviour. While for a fixed number of random demands increasing the 
length of the operational time interval reduces the probability of overlapping, with random 
demands following a Poisson process on a time interval, increasing the length of the 
operational time increases the probability of overlapping.  
Accordingly, Equation (21) can also be used for setting reliability requirements to provide 
a stochastic time separation (avoiding clustering) of duration at least s, with high probability. 
For any specified time of demand s and a minimum probability 0p  with which the separation 
intervals of length at least s must exist, solving the equations with respect to   yields an 
upper bound *  (an envelope) for the number density of the random events. The envelope 
guarantees that whenever for the number density   of events, *   is fulfilled, the 
specified minimum separation of length at least s will exist between the random requests, 
with a minimum probability 0p . In other words, with the specified probability 0p , there will 
be no unsatisfied request for the required resource. 
It is necessary to point out, that a stochastic time separation can be achieved not only by 
reducing the number density of random demands and reducing the demand times but also by 
increasing the number of sources servicing the random demands. This type of stochastic 
separation also reduces the probability that there will be a random demand for which no 
service will be available. 
The proposed idea of stochastic time and space separation could form the core of a new 
methodology for reliability analysis and setting reliability requirements based on minimum 
separation intervals between random events on a finite interval. 
 
 
3. Deterministic separation of risk-critical factors 
 
Deterministic separation of random events on a time interval is present when, for the random 
events, a zero probability of overlapping is guaranteed. Full separation is important for 
scheduling critical random events for which any overlapping has grave consequences and, 
because of this, a simultaneous presence of events must be excluded completely. 
Familiar examples of a deterministic separation of risk-critical factors are: (i) the time 
separation provided by the traffic lights, preventing collision between intersecting flows of 
traffic and flows of pedestrians and (ii) the space separation provided by the isolation of 
intersecting flows of traffic and flows of pedestrians at different levels in order to eliminate 
the risk of collisions and accidents. 
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3.1 Deterministic time separation by scheduling 
 
3.1.1 Deterministic time separation by scheduling, with fixed starts of the events 
 
Deterministic separation in time is required from risk-critical factors or entities whose 
simultaneous presence must be excluded completely.  
The time separation by scheduling enforces consistent time spacing between hazardous 
events. The deterministic time separation is used in air traffic control, where it enforces 
consistent time spacing between arriving aircrafts, on the basis of real-time information about 
the weather, headwinds, altitude and speed. In this respect, the air-traffic control clearance is 
an important instrument providing the necessary separation in order to avoid collisions within 
controlled airspace. The separation provided by the air-traffic control clearance also 
guarantees a sufficient runway approach capacity which keeps the risk of accidents low.  
 
3.1.2 Deterministic time separation with random starts of the events  
 
The method used for deriving the equation related to the probability of overlapping of a 
fixed number of random events can also be used to provide a deterministic separation of 
events on a time interval whose start times must be random.  
Suppose that n random events each with duration d, need to be scheduled over the time 
interval 0,L such that the possibility of overlapping of random events is excluded completely 
and, at the same time, the start times is  of the events are truly random along the time interval 
(0,L). 
Consider the configuration for which the random start times nsss ',...,',' 21  are generated 
along the smaller length dnL )1(  , by a random generator of uniformly distributed random 
numbers (Fig.5a). From this configuration, the configuration in Fig.5b can be obtained by 
placing after each randomly generated is '  point, a duration interval with length d (Fig.5b). 
The start times in the obtained X-configuration in Fig.5b are 11 'ss  , dss  22 ' , dss 2'33 
,..., dnss nn )1('  .    
As a result, the random events are scheduled over the time interval 0,L in such a way that 
no overlapping of random events is present and at the same time, the start times is  of the 
events are truly random along the time interval (0,L). 
 
 
Figure 5. Deterministic separation with random start times of the events. 
 
 
3.2 Deterministic time and space separation by using interlocks 
 
Preventing the simultaneous occurrence of two events can be done by implementing a 
sentinel whose state is returned as ‘busy’ if an event is still active. The state of the sentinel 
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can be interpreted subjectively (separation by interpretation). The state of the sentinel is 
checked and a new event can be launched only if the current state of the sentinel is ‘free’. 
Upon termination of the event, the state of the sentinel is changed to ‘free’. The sentinel can 
also be built in an interlock which prevents the overlapping of events. 
A realisation of this mechanism for deterministic time separation has been given in Fig.6 
with the three buttons B1,B2 and B3 which activate corresponding electro-motors e1,e2 or 
e3, each of which is responsible for a motion in a particular direction. Once a button is 
pushed, the circuit of the corresponding electro-motor must stay latched until the stop button 
S is pressed and the circuit of the electromotor is opened. While the circuit of any particular 
electromotor remains energised, pushing any other button must have no effect.  
Consider the circuit in Fig.6a. Pushing button B1, closes the normally open contact k1 and 
the circuit of electromotor e1 is latched into energized state. At the same time, the normally 
closed sentinel contact F is opened, which prevents energising the circuit of any other 
electro-motor (e2 or e3) (Fig.6b). Electromotor e1 will be running until the stop button S is 
pressed. Pressing the stop button S de-energizes the circuit of electro-motor e1 and restores 
the open contact F into its normally closed state. This is effectively a process of moving the 
sentinel into a ‘free’ state. Only now will the circuit react to pressing of any other button. 
Pressing button B2, for example, closes the normally open contact k2 and the circuit of 
electromotor e2 is latched into energised state (Fig.6d). At the same time, the normally closed 
sentinel contact F is opened and the process is repeated.  
 
 
Figure 6. Deterministic time separation by using an interlock. 
 
The dangerous simultaneous energising of two electro-motors has been excluded by the 
time interlock implemented through a sentinel. 
The deterministic space separation can also be based on interlocks. A mechanism by 
which space separation can be achieved is through opening a power circuit or control circuit. 
A simple implementation of this separation mechanism is the interruption of the power 
supply circuit from removing the protective shield of rotating machinery. As a result, it is 
impossible to operate the machine without positioning first the protective shield in place, 
which reduces the likelihood of injury. 
A more sophisticated example of this type of space interlock is the presence-sensing 
safeguard interlocks which stop the operation of hazard equipment if a person is detected in a 
location where injury can occur. The presence-sensing system could be based on laser beams, 
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light or infra-red beams. Beams of light forming a curtain are generated and if any of the 
beams is blocked by a person moving towards the hazard equipment, a control circuit is 
opened and the power to the hazard equipment is switches off. 
Another mechanism of space separation is the trapped-key interlock. In one of the possible 
implementations, the access for repair to the hazard equipment is through a door operated by 
a key which is held trapped on the door until the door is firmly closed again by operating the 
key. While opening the door, the key also operates a switch interrupting the power supply. 
The hazard equipment cannot be re-energized until the door is closed and the key released. 
Releasing the key essentially guarantees that the hazard equipment has been made safe. 
 
3.4 Deterministic logical separation by using a shared unique key  
 
Deterministic logical separation is present when it is logically impossible for a dangerous 
operation to occur at a given point in time or at a given space location. Deterministic logical 
separation is also in place if it is logically impossible for two or more objects to be in a 
dangerous proximity at a given location or at a given time. 
In logical separation, no barriers of any kind are set between the different parts of the 
system yet separation is still present. The dangerous proximity of hazards and triggers and 
hazards and targets is made to be logically impossible. 
Consider the safety problem related to preventing the hand of an operator from being in 
the cutting area of a guillotine. If the cutting action is activated only by a simultaneous 
pressure on two separate knobs/handles which engage both hands of the operator, it is 
logically impossible for the operator’s hand to accidentally reside in the cutting area, at any 
time. The operator’s hands have been separated from the cutting area through the logic of the 
guillotine activation. This is an example of a deterministic logical separation reducing the risk 
of an accident. 
Logical separation avoiding dangerous simultaneous occurrence of processes can be 
implemented relatively easily by using the mechanism of the shared unique key. A unique 
shared key is required for activating each process in accomplishing a particular action. As a 
result, the dangerous action cannot occur because the unique key cannot be simultaneously 
present to activate more than one process. If a switch can be activated only through a 
specially calibrated unique key, the key will be needed for sequentially activating each 
process and no simultaneous occurrence of two processes could possibly occur.  
The realisation of this idea can be seen on Fig.7. Suppose that a particular process requires 
an adjustment of a specimen before switching on X-ray beam. The dangerous simultaneous 
occurrence is possible if a person appears in Room A and switches on the X-ray beam while 
the operator is still adjusting the specimen under the X-ray head in room B (Fig.7).  
 
 
Figure 7. An example of logical separation 
 
The dangerous action can be prevented from occurring by a logical separation 
implementing a shared unique key. The design of the X-ray equipment must be made in such 
a way that the switch releasing the X-ray shield in order to position the specimen and the 
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switch operating the X-ray beam in room A can only be done by using the same shared unique 
key. Switching on the X-ray beam and adjusting the specimen would then require the same 
object (the shared unique key) to be at two different places, at the same time, which is 
impossible. The safety risk has been eliminated by a logical separation based on a shared 
unique key. 
Logical separation leads to low-cost yet very efficient designs eliminating safety risks. It is a 
simple yet underutilized generic tool for improving safety and reducing risk. 
 
 
3.5  Deterministic separation by providing conditions for independent operation  
 
Deterministic separation can be realised by providing conditions for independent operation of 
components. If failure of one component makes the failure of another component more likely, 
the reliability of the system can be improved by making the two devices operate 
independently from one another. Consider the operation of two devices where the second 
device is powered from the first device. Failure of the first device will cause a loss of power 
for the second device. The reliability of the system can be improved if the operation of the 
two devices is separated.  
Often, in control systems, to cut the cost, the control modules share the same cables. In 
this case, the control channels are not independent because failure of a common cable will 
cause several control channels to fail. Separating (decoupling) the control channels ensures 
the independent operation of the control channels and improves the reliability of the system.  
Separation to block a common cause is present when a component or a group of 
components are distanced (insulated) from the action of a common cause, simultaneously 
affecting the performance of the components. A common cause reduces the reliability of a 
number of components simultaneously. The affected components are then more likely to fail, 
which reduces the overall system reliability. Detailed discussion of separation mechanisms 
for blocking a common cause has been presented in Todinov, 2015). 
 
 
4. Separation on a parameter, conditions or scale 
 
Reducing risk by a separation assuring distinct behaviour at different values of a risk-critical 
parameter is present when different characteristics of an object at different values of a risk-
critical parameter are ensured to reduce the likelihood of failure or the consequences given 
that failure has occurred. 
Introducing deliberate weak links and stress limiters is an important mechanism for assuring 
separation from dangerous levels of risk-critical parameters. 
 
4.1 Separation at distinct values of a risk-critical parameter through deliberate weak 
links and stress limiters 
 
The deliberate weak links are deliberately created points of weakness towards which a 
potential failure is channelled in order to limit the magnitude of the consequences given that 
failure has occurred. The mechanisms through which the deliberate weak links operate can be 
classified into several types.  
4.1.1. Deliberate weak links designed to separate a valuable part/component from 
excessive levels of the stress (current, voltage, temperature, pressure, force, etc.)  
Effectively, this type of deliberate weak links separate from excessive levels of a 
particular stress. A well-known example related to this type of deliberate weak links are the 
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electric fuses, which protect electrical circuits against current/voltage exceeding critical 
tolerable levels. Another common example of this type of deliberate weak links is the shear 
pin in a mechanical coupling, which transmits torque up to a specified level, beyond which 
the shear pin fails and disconnects the driving shaft from the mechanical device. As a result, 
the critical torque resistance of the mechanical device cannot be reached and the mechanical 
device is separated from overload. Rupture discs are also examples of such deliberate weak 
links. They protect vessels from over-pressurisation by providing separation from excessive 
load. 
Crash cones used in race cars separate against excessive deceleration during impact by 
deforming during an impact thereby increasing the time during which the deceleration force 
is present. Sacrificial anodes can also be considered to be deliberate weak links separating 
components (underground pipes, underwater installations, ship hulls) from excessive 
corrosion. 
Deliberate weak links can also separate from excessive wear. For example, cheap rubber 
segments bolted on top of a conveyor act as deliberate weak links. They take all the excessive 
wear and their failure is followed by the replacement of a cheap rubber segment rather than 
by the replacement of an expensive conveyor belt. 
4.1.2. Deliberate weak links designed to deflect the failure location from a region (part 
of the system) where the cost of failure is high. 
Effectively, this mechanism provides a separation of the failure location from expensive 
part of the system. An efficient implementation of this type weak link is through 
appropriately placed pre-cracks or stress-relieve gaps around the protected valuable part of 
the system. The pre-cracks or gaps offer a small resistance to the propagation of the main 
crack. As a result, the main crack is deflected along the deliberate weak paths and damage on 
the valuable part of the system is prevented. 
Cuts made parallel to cables buried underground act as deliberately weakened paths. In the 
case of very low temperatures freezing the ground, the shrinkage cracks appearing in the 
ground are deflected alongside the weak cuts which offer small resistance to crack 
propagation. As a result, the cracks in the frozen ground are deflected along the deliberate 
weak paths thereby preventing severing of the cables. 
Consider another example related to rigid floor tiling over a concrete slab. Concrete slabs 
shrink as they dry out. The shrinkage is often sufficient to form cracks which propagate 
through the slabs. The floor tiles laid over these cracks will also crack and the result is costly 
damage. Deflections in suspended floors can also induce high compressive stresses in rigid 
floor tiling which cause delamination and cracks. 
The costly damage could be avoided easily if deliberate weak links are created within the 
flow coverings as deliberate gaps (filled with plastic) which allow stress relieve and deflect 
possible cracks in the tiling caused by shrinkage.  
 
4.1.3 Deliberate weak links designed to provide warning that the system is in a state of 
overload. 
Effectively, this type of deliberate weak links separate from failure by providing a 
warning.  
A mechanism through which this type of separation can be designed is to ensure that 
before the main failure, a secondary failure occurs that provides warning alerting the operator 
to decrease the load and avoid catastrophic failure.  
An implementation of this separation mechanism is the retrofitable cable mechanical fuse 
in Fig.8 (US patent US20110027007 A1).  
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Figure 8. Retrofitable cable mechanical fuse 
 
A cable 1 forms a slack inside the device and is attached securely to the device by the 
clamps 2. In normal operation conditions, the load is carried only by the weakened part 3 of 
the device. When the load exceeds a critical level, the weakened part first bends, then breaks 
and finally the load is transferred to the cable 1. This provides ample warning to the operator 
that the permitted operating load has been exceeded. 
 
4.1.4 Deliberate weak links designed to trigger or activate other systems in order to 
reduce the consequences from failure. 
An example of a weak link of this type is the alloy with low melting point which seals a 
reservoir with fluid under pressure (sprinkler system). In the case of fire, the deliberate weak 
link fails and a jet of fluid is released in the premise where fire started.   
Similar to the deliberate weak links, stress limiters also separate from excessive levels of 
stress. A common example of a stress limiter is the anti-surge protector preventing voltage 
from reaching dangerous levels that could damage electrical equipment. The safety pressure 
valve, activated when pressure reaches a critical level, is another common example of a stress 
limiter separating the loading stress from the strength of the material. The friction clutches is 
another example of a stress limiter, that has been specifically designed to slip during a torque 
overload. While deliberate weak links are designed to fail and separate from excessive 
loading stress, stress limiters separate from excessive loading stress without necessarily 
suffering failure. 
It is tempting to consider stress limiters as instances of deliberate weak links because they 
also channel failure in order to separate from excessive levels of loading stress. However, 
there are essential differences. Not all stress limiters are deliberate weak links just as not all 
deliberate weak links are stress limiters. 
The retrofitable cable mechanical fuse from Fig.8, for example, is a deliberate weak link 
without being a stress limiter. The device only provides warning and does not limit the load. 
Alternatively, the specially designed shoulder on the screw in Fig.9 which prevents over-
tightening of the screw and damaging the tightened plastic component, is a stress limiter 
without being a deliberate weak link. The magnitude of the loading stress on the clamped part 
is limited without a deliberate weakness. 
 
 
Figure 9. An example of a stress limiter: eliminating the risk of damaging the plastic part by a special design of 
the screw. 
 
 
4.4 Separation on a parameter by using the mechanism of phase changes 
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Separation by using phase changes is an important mechanism to provide a separation on 
‘temperature’ which is a common risk-critical parameter. A very reliable separation on 
operating temperature can be made by using the changes in the aggregate state of the material 
which are guaranteed with temperature. Thus, freezing volatile and flammable substance 
during transportation eliminates the risk of spillage and explosion during a road accident. The 
low melting point of special alloys can be used for highly reliable triggers for sprinkler 
systems in the case of fire. The reliability of complex triggers based on thermostats, sensors 
and electronic circuits, etc., is not very high. 
Phase changes of the magnetic state of materials can also be used for separation. During 
induction heating for example, to prevent overheating of an object beyond a critical 
temperature crT , the alloy could be selected with Curie temperature equal to crT . At a 
temperature crT , from ferromagnetic (temperatures crTT  ), the material will become 
diamagnetic (temperatures crTT  ). 
Because the magnetic properties of the material change at crTT  , induction heating of the 
material beyond crTT   is no longer possible therefore overheating is not possible. 
Separation based on evaporation has been used to protect the control equipment in rockets 
from overheating. Rockets are placed in a foam shell which evaporates after the rocket 
launching. 
 
 
5. Separation of functions, properties or behaviour for distinct components 
or parts 
 
This is an important type of deterministic separation that can be implemented through the 
following basic mechanisms and techniques. 
 
5.1 Separation of functions to maximize reliability 
 
Separation of functions consists of assigning different functions to different parts of a 
component or system. Separating critical functions among different parts/components 
improves reliability and reduces risk through several distinct mechanisms. 
(i) Separating functions to different parts makes it easy to optimise the separate parts so 
that maximum reliability is achieved. A single component is difficult to optimise for each 
function. A seal, for example, carries two basic functions: sealing - isolating particular fluids 
and load-carrying function - resisting tensile loads or bending moments. In designing a joint, 
the load-carrying function cannot be assigned to the part carrying the sealing function. The 
reliability of the joint will be low if a single seal is required to carry the two basic functions. 
A common design error that has caused high-impact failures is combining the critical 
functions of load carrying and sealing in the design of a joint. Such was the case with the 
space shuttle Challenger booster’s O-ring, which was simultaneously sealing the section of 
the assembly and taking the pressure of combustion (Ullman, 2003). Achieving high 
reliability requires separating the sealing function and the load-carrying function to distinct 
parts. Each of the distinct parts can be optimised for the respective function and the result is a 
highly reliable joint assembly.  
Consider also a highly pressurized container containing corrosive fluid. It is difficult to 
optimise the material of the container so that high levels of strength and corrosion resistance 
are attained simultaneously. Low-carbon steels, for example, have high strength and low cost 
but their corrosion resistance in contact with the corrosive fluid is low. Conversely, plastics 
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have a high corrosion resistance in contact with the fluid but possess low strength. What is 
difficult to achieve by a single component, can be achieved by separating the functions 
strength and corrosion resistance into two distinct components: a steel container providing the 
required strength under pressure and corrosion-resistant plastic lining providing the corrosion 
resistance.  
(ii) Separating functions to reduce load magnitudes. This separation mechanism works 
by separating the load into several components instead of being carried by a single 
component. A component performing many functions is over-loaded and its strength can be 
easily exceeded if combined multiple demands are present. The increased resultant load 
increases the rate of degradation for the component. By separating the load into several 
components, the load on a single component is reduced. 
For example, a single bearing carrying both high-magnitude radial and high-magnitude 
axial forces is often overloaded. Because of the high-magnitude resultant load, the rate of 
degradation of the bearing is elevated and its reliability is low. 
By separating the functions of carrying radial and axial loads into two bearings, the load is 
effectively split between: a roller bearing resisting only radial loads and no axial loads and a 
ball bearing resisting only axial loads and no radial load. The load on each of the two bearing 
is reduced, the degradation rate is reduced and the reliability is increased. 
 
 
(iii) Separation of a single function into multiple components  
 
This separation mechanism is particularly relevant to separation involving a single 
function assigned to several identical function carriers. Separation of identical functions 
decreases the vulnerability of components to a single failure. Suppose that a particular 
function has been assigned to a component. Failure of the component will then cause a loss of 
the function. If the function is assigned to several identical components such that each 
component performs the same function, a loss of the component will not entail a loss of the 
function. Furthermore, the separation also relieves the stress on the overloaded component.  
The traditional method of improving reliability by implementing redundancy is effectively 
a special case of the method of separation where the same function has been separated into 
identical components carrying the same function. 
Separation of a single function of a main component to be carried by multiple smaller 
parts into which the main component is divided, is the essence of the method of segmentation, 
discussed in detail in (Todinov, 2017). Segmentation increases the tolerance of components 
to flaws causing local damage, reduces the rate of damage accumulation and damage 
escalation and reduces the hazard potential. Segmentation essentially replaces a sudden 
failure on a macro-level with gradual deterioration of the system on a micro-level through 
non-critical failures. Segmentation can even reduce the likelihood of a loss from opportunity 
bets and the likelihood of erroneous conclusion from imperfect tests (Todinov, 2017). 
As a result, the method of segmentation can be considered to be a special case of the 
method of separation. 
 
 
(iv) Separation of functions for a mutual compensation of deficiencies 
The separation of functions also works through the mechanism of mutual compensation of 
deficiencies associated with the different components building a system. A typical example is 
the hybrid joint, combining an adhesive joint and mechanical fixing. There is a clear 
separation of functions: the adhesive part reduces the stress concentration along the joint 
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while the mechanical fixing increases the peel resistance of the adhesive joint and its 
stiffness. 
Such a separation is often present in the design of complex alloys where some of the 
microstructural constituents provide wear resistance, while other constituents provide 
toughness (resistance to crack propagation). 
 
 (v) Separation of functions to prevent unwanted interactions 
This separation mechanism (also known as ‘separation of concerns’) is well-known in the 
design of computer programs (Reade, 1989). A concern is a relatively simple, self-contained 
task, addressed by a programme section. Separation of functions in programming is achieved 
by encapsulating data and statements inside a section of code that has a well-defined 
interface. This results into a modular programme, consisting of procedures and functions. The 
encapsulation means that the variables defined into the encapsulated module (procedure or a 
function) remain only visible within the module and can be altered only within the module. 
Encapsulation avoids unwanted interactions between different pieces of code in the same 
programme. Avoiding unwanted interactions avoids the possibility of side effects and 
difficult to rectify bugs if a variable from one particular section of code is altered from 
another section of code. Furthermore, the encapsulated sections of code can be updated and 
tested independently, without having to alter code in the rest of the sections, which 
significantly decreases the possibility of introducing bugs. The encapsulated piece of code is 
essentially a black box with specified input and output, whose content can be independently 
developed and replaced without affecting the logic of the programme. 
 
(vi) Separation of functions to improve the reliability of an estimated value 
 
Separation of functions can even be applied to improve the reliability of an estimated value. 
Suppose that a probability value has been estimated from a theoretical expression. The 
reliability of the estimated value can be increased if the function related to estimating the 
particular value is separated into two or more fundamentally distinct methods. If the 
calculated values from the separate methods agree, not only is the confidence in the reliability 
of the estimated value very high, the validity of each alternative estimation method is also 
confirmed. 
An application example can be given with equation (4) regarding the probability of no 
overlapping of a fixed number of random events, with different durations, on a time interval. 
This equation has been derived by a probabilistic argument. The probability of no 
overlapping of a fixed number of random events, with different durations, on a time interval 
has also been evaluated by a Monte Carlo simulation. Both methods yield the same result 
which not only confirms the validity of equation (4) but also the validity of the Monte Carlo 
simulation algorithm. 
 
 
(vii) Separation of information  
 
This separation mechanism prevents users from becoming overloaded, confused and 
disoriented with too much information, which is a commons source of costly human errors. 
To mitigate the risk of human errors induced by information complexity and overload, 
information present in machine-human interfaces is separated into layers and only the layer 
of immediate relevance to the task at hand is displayed. 
A common error in design of machine-human interfaces is to present to the user all available 
options which leads to cognitive overload and human errors. With the use of the mechanism 
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of information separation, the interface is designed in such a way that users who do not need 
particular options, never see them. 
 
(viii) Separation of duties to reduce the risk of errors and fraud  
 
The essence of this separation mechanism is the division of a particular key task, subject to 
abuse into sub-tasks assigned to different individuals.  
Separation of duties among different individuals in an organization enforces accountability, 
eliminates conflicts of interest and errors. The result is a significantly reduced risk. Not 
properly following the separation of duties often entails disastrous consequences. 
Thus, a person with a duty of providing a security system cannot design the security system 
and also test it. The separation of duties in this case, avoids the conflict of interest where a 
person has to report on the weaknesses of his own creation. This principle is also followed 
widely in the delivery of software which combines designing the software and testing it. To 
avoid costly bugs, the task of designing the software must be separated from the task of 
testing the software.  
Separation of duties in handling financial transactions (e.g. authorizing the transaction, 
receiving the funds, depositing the funds, recording the transaction, reconciling the bank 
statement) reduces the possibility of fraud. No single individual has the ability to both 
perpetrate and conceal fraud because, due to the separation of duties, committing fraud would 
require the collusion between several people. 
Sales transactions include conducting a sale and managing the customer delivery. Separating 
the duty related to conducting the sale from the duty of managing the customer delivery 
prevents the risk of falsifying sales records to non-existing customers and stealing funds from 
the company. 
 
 
5.2 Separation of reliability across components according to their cost of failure 
 
A very important separation mechanism for reducing risk is that the allocation of 
reliability across components should be proportional to their cost of failure. Components 
whose failure is associated with large cost of failure should have a proportionally high built-
in relioability. This is the underlying principle of the risk-based design (Todinov, 2007). 
Components, processes and operations used in safety-critical applications should be with 
higher reliability compared to analogous components used in non-critical systems. 
Failure of the cement used for sealing an oil production subsea well for example, causes a 
catastrophic pollution of the environment. Consequently, the cement seal should have a 
proportionately high built-in reliability. Because of the extremely high cost of failure, the 
reliability of the seal in a production well cannot be similar to the reliability of other cement 
seals not associated with such a high cost of failure. It must be significantly higher so that the 
probability of failure is significantly reduced which leads to a proportional reduction of the 
expected potential loss. Separation of reliability based on the cost of failure is therefore an 
important mechanism of reducing risk.  
This principle can be illustrated with a production system with hierarchy (Figure 10).  
In the production system  from Figure 10, there are six sources of production (generators, oil 
and gas wells, pumps, etc.) supplying commodity (electricity, oil, gas, water) to a destination 
t. Despite that components C2 and C3 may be identical, failure of component C3 causes loss 
of production from source S6 only while the failure of component C2 causes loss of 
production from five sources (S1-S5). The reliability level of component C2 should be 
significantly higher than the reliability level of component C3. 
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Figure 10. A production system with hierarchy based on six production sourcess. 
 
The higher the component in the hierarchy, the more production units will be affected by its 
failure, the larger the reliability level for this component should be. 
The separation of reliability according to the cost of failure has also a direct application in 
distributing a fixed budget for improving the reliability of components in order to achieve a 
maximum overall risk reduction. Distributing the investment uniformly (homogeneously) 
across all components is, as a rule, an inferior strategy. To achieve a maximum risk 
reduction, the available risk reduction budget should be preferentially distributed to improve 
the reliability of components whose failure is associated with the largest consequences and 
for which a unit investment yields the maximum risk reduction. A special dynamic 
programming algorithm recognising the intrinsic value of the available budget has been 
developed for this purpose in (Todinov, 2016). 
 
 
 
5.3 Separation to counter poor performance caused by homogeneity  
 
5.3.1 Separation of strength across components and zones according to the experienced 
stresses 
 
The mechanism of separation countering the drawbacks of homogeneity is necessary in 
cases where the average property characterising a homogeneous state cannot provide the 
required reliability in terms of effective resistance against combined hazards or damage 
accumulation factors. This mechanism is needed in engineering design, for assuring that the 
different parts of a component have the appropriate properties needed to successfully resist 
the local loading. A homogeneous material with average value of the strength (resistance) is 
not optimised for any local type of loading and cannot provide sufficient resistance in all 
parts of the component. If the type of loading at a particular location is a cyclic loading with 
large amplitude, the required response from the material is high fatigue resistance. If the type 
of loading at a particular location is static loading and no corrosion is present, there is no 
need for a high fatigue resistance because the conditions responsible for the development and 
propagation of fatigue cracks are missing. Since the type of loading, is not homogeneous, the 
resistance also cannot be homogeneous. 
The mechanism for implementing this type of separation requires assuring uneven 
distribution of the resistance against a particular stress for different components or different 
parts of the same component depending on the type and intensity of the local stress the 
component/zone experiences.  
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 The application of this separation mechanism is illustrated with the real-life 
application in Fig.11. The container 1 and the cylindrical hinges 2 in Fig 11a are made of the 
same material, with relatively low fatigue resistance. An asymmetric lid (not shown) is 
rotating around the hinges 2 and loads the hinges with the pulsating force F. Because of the 
pulsating load and the small fatigue resistance of the material of the container, cracks appear 
at the base of the hinges and soon one of the hinges fails. Applying the mechanism of 
separation according to the experienced local stress, the material of the hinges must have a 
significantly larger fatigue resistance compared to the rest of the container. If the hinges are 
made of material with high fatigue resistance and inserted in the wall (as shown in Fig.11b), 
the fatigue resistance and the reliability of the container are increased significantly. 
 
 
Figure 11. Improving the reliability of a container with rotating lid. 
 
 
5.3.2 Separation of properties can also be used to create a component/system which, in 
order to be reliable, must satisfy conflicting requirements.  
For example, a gear must be hard, to endure large contact stresses and intensive wear and 
soft, to endure impacts. These conflicting requirements require conflicting material 
properties: the surface of the gear must be hard while the core of the gear must be soft. In a 
compromise, with no separation of properties, a homogeneous material will be selected which 
has a satisfactory hardness to resist wear and satisfactory toughness to resist shock loading. 
The result is a mediocre solution which is neither optimised against wear nor against shock 
loading. These contradicting requirements can be simultaneously guaranteed if a separation 
of properties is implemented. These conflicting properties can be guaranteed by the 
separation of properties achieved through case hardening (Kalpakjian and Schmid, 2001). 
This consists of a local induction heating of the surface layers followed by quenching. Case 
hardening improves the resistance of the surface to large contact stresses and wear, while 
leaving the core tough which makes it resist impact loads.  
 
 
5.4 Separation in geometry 
Separation in geometry is present when different parts of an object or assembly have different 
geometry to provide optimal conditions maximizing reliability and minimizing the risk of 
failure. An example of separation in geometry can be given with the tapered cantilever beam 
in (Fig.12a). The beam can be designed to improve its load resistance for the same volume of 
material by tapering. The beam is made thicker at the cantilevered end where the stresses are  
the largest and with the smallest thickness at the free end where the stresses are the smallest. 
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Figure 12. a,b) Separation in geometry to improve the load-carrying capacity of a cantilever beam, c) 
Separation in geometry to maximize the load-carrying capacity of a beam which requires building a 
mathematical model based on the method of separation. 
 
In many cases, the separation in geometry can be done efficiently only after building and 
analysing a model based on separation. Such a case is presented in Fig.10c which features a 
rectangular beam cut out of a cylindrical log of radius R=0.2m. It is required to determine the 
dimensions b and h of the beam such that the beam carries the maximum possible load 
without failure during bending. The maximum load-carrying capacity of the beam during 
bending is proportional to the second moment of area 12/3bhI  . The larger the second 
moment of area the larger the load-carrying capacity of the beam. 
The design parameters are the dimensions of the beam b and h. Between them there is a 
geometrical constraint expressed by the analytical relationship 222 )2/()2/( Rhb  , from 
which the design parameter b can be eliminated by expressing it as a function of the other 
design parameter h: 224 hRb  . The second moment of area can now be presented as a 
function of a single design parameter: 
223 4
12
1
hRhI                                                          (23) 
where h varies in the interval Rh 20  .  
The separation in geometry of the beam could proceed towards making the beam wider 
(increasing b) and shorter (decreasing h) or making the beam slender (decreasing b and 
increasing h). It is impossible to guess the right level of separation which delivers the largest 
strength. 
To maximise the load-carrying capacity of the beam, the second moment of area I from 
equation (23) needs to be maximised while complying with the existing constraint 
Rh 20  . 
At the end points of the interval Rh 20  , 0I . Maximising the objective function is 
done in the standard way by taking the first derivative and equating it to zero. There are no 
points from the interval Rh 20   where the first derivative is not defined, therefore the 
local maximum will also be a global maximum. It is thus obtained that the stationary point 
3464.03  Rh m corresponds to the local and the global maximum of the second moment 
of area in the interval Rh 20  . The corresponding value for the parameter b is 0.2m. The 
beam with the largest load carrying capacity that can be cut from the log is with dimensions 
0.2mx0.35m. 
This example also demonstrates that to derive maximum risk-reduction benefit from the 
method of separation, in a number of cases, it is required to build and analyse a mathematical 
model or algorithm based on the method of separation.  
A limitation of the introduced analytical model of stochastic separation is that it is 
applicable to a single source servicing the demands. An important continuation of future 
research would be to extend the presented analytical model to a case of multiple sources 
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servicing random demands on a time interval. Another important continuation would be a 
stochastic separation based on the expected overlapped time fraction by the random events. 
A classification of the discussed methods of stochastic and deterministic separation is given 
in Fig.13. 
 
 
Figure 13. Classification of the discussed methods of stochastic and deterministic separation. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. Various mechanisms through which the method of separation works in improving 
reliability and reducing risk have been introduced for the first time. A comprehensive 
classification of the discussed methods of stochastic and deterministic separation has also 
been presented. 
 
2. The fundamental concept ‘stochastic separation of random events based on the probability 
of overlapping’ has been introduced for the first time.  
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3. Efficient methods for providing stochastic separation by reducing the duration times of 
overlapping critical random events on a time interval have been presented for the first time. 
 
4. The probability of overlapping of critical events, randomly appearing on a time interval, is 
practically insensitive to the distribution of their durations.  
 
5. The probability of overlapping of risk-critical events, randomly appearing on a time 
interval, is practically insensitive to the variance of their duration times as long as the mean 
remains the same. A rigorous proof has been presented that even for two random events on a 
time interval, if their duration fractions are small, the probability of overlapping will be 
practically insensitive to the variance of their duration times. 
 
6. The independence of the probability of overlapping on the variance of the event durations 
provides the valuable opportunity to work with duration times characterised by their means 
only and not requiring data related to the variance of the duration times. 
 
7. In a number of cases the only way to extract benefit from the method of separation, in a 
number of cases, it is required to build and analyse a mathematical model or algorithm based 
on the method of separation.  
 
8. It is demonstrated improving reliability by including redundancy, improving reliability by 
a segmentation and some of the deliberate weak link techniques and stress limiters techniques 
for reducing risk are effectively special cases of a deterministic separation. 
 
9. Separation on a parameter is an efficient technique for reducing risk. The separation on 
properties is an efficient technique for compensating the drawbacks associated with a 
selection based on homogeneous properties. 
 
10. The logical separation based on the mechanism of the shared key is an efficient and low-
cost separation risk reduction technique. 
 
11. The method of separation transcends applications in mechanical engineering and is also 
efficient in software engineering, financial control, management and design of human-
machine interfaces.  
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